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THE JANUS FACE OF RACE: RHONDA M. WILLIAMS 
ON ORTHODOX ECONOMIC SCHIZOPHRENIA 
Patrick L. Mason 
The American Negro has the great advantage ofhaving never believed 
that collection of myths to which white Americans cling . . . .  The ten- 
dency has really been, insofar as this was possible, to dismiss white 
people as the slightly mad victims of their own brainwashing. 
[The problem of the color line is] a fearful and delicate problem, 
which comprises, when it does not corrupt, all the American efforts to 
build a better world--here, there, or anywhere. It is for this reason that 
everything white Americans think they believe in must now be reex- 
amined. --James Baldwin (The Price of the Ticket, 377-378). 
Unfortunately, Baldwin is not required reading in graduate conomics. 
"The Janus Face of Race" is the title of the introductory chapter from 
Race, Markets, and Social Outcomes (Mason and Will iams 1997). Will- 
iams selected the title to capture the interpretative schizophrenia of or- 
thodox economists eeking to rationalize racial inequality as a failure 
stemming from the behaviors and values of African-American individu- 
als, families, and communities. Surely, Baldwin would ask whether pro- 
ponents of the orthodox tradition on racial inequality and markets have 
become slightly mad victims of their own brainwashing? 
It may be so. The empirical record certainly demonstrates a stubborn 
persistence in asserting black inferiority, Quoting from "The Janus Face 
of Race" (Mason and Williams 1997, 1), orthodox economists readily 
assert hat, 
On the one hand, race matters when the discussion is focused on 
anti-social behavior, social choices, and undesired market outcomes. 
Inexplicably, African Americans are more likely to prefer welfare, 
lower labor force participation, and unemployment. On the other 
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hand, race does not matter when the subject of discussion is eco- 
nomically productive or socially acceptable activities and legal mar- 
ket choices (for example, [wages, employment, and education[). 
Rhonda Williams and I argued that this Janus-faced construction of 
race is maintained by an unexamined and uncritical adherence to the 
market power hypothesis, which asserts that racial discrimination and 
market competition are inversely related. Discrimination will persist only 
in those areas of society where market competition is least operative. In 
this framework, individuals may exercise substantial discriminatory be- 
havior in marital choice, residential location, school selection for their 
children, religious affiliation, organizational membership, ublic policy 
formation, and even governmental employment decisions, but, incred- 
ibly, merit is allegedly the sole determinant of economic outcomes in 
competitive markets. 
There is an alternative perspective, one that begins with the histori- 
cally validated proposition that Western capitalist societies are racialized 
class (and gender) formations (Williams 1983, c1944; Marable 1983; 
Cox 1959). Market actors learn to analyze their personal and social envi- 
ronment (family life, neighborhoods, religious institutions and concepts, 
schools, workplaces, sources of entertainment, etc.) through historically 
specific racial norms. These norms are the pre--and supra-market pro- 
cesses through which market actors develop theories, interpret data, evalu- 
ate credentials and performance, impute meaning and assess information 
quality, and organize and explain social structures and relations of power 
(Omi and Winant 1994). 
For example, we might periodize U.S. racial-economic eras as follows: 
slavery (1619-1865), Reconstruction (1865-1877), Jim Crow (1877- 
1965), the Second Reconstruction (1954-1973), and the White Backlash 
(1969-present). In each era, repeated strategic interactions among market 
actors establish the racial-economic norms through which each actor learns 
to interpret and produce socioeconomic outcomes. In turn, in each era the 
creation and transformation of racial-economic norms is intimately re- 
lated to the secular processes of capital accumulation and capitalist com- 
petition. From this perspective, agents use their own and other agents' 
identity claims as sources of strategic information that they can use (or 
attempt o use) to pursue their own self-interest (Darity, Mason, and 
Stewart 2002). Market and social discrimination then is not simply a 
matter of exogenous 'tastes;' rather, discrimination reflects a racialized 
economic norm that furthers racial domination. 
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It is this notion of discrimination that informs a generation of hetero- 
dox theories (Baron 1971; Darity 1989; Darity and Williams 1985; Har- 
ris 1972; Mason 1993, 1995, and 1996; Swinton 1978; Williams 1987, 
1991; Williams and Kenison 1996). Although differing in detail, these 
heterodox approaches collectively argue that discrimination is endog- 
enous to capital accumulation and emanates from the competitive struggle 
for material advantage. Firms discriminate because they have the power 
to do so and because it increases firm profitability. Individuals form 
coalitions with those of similar identity to limit the competitive strength 
of those outside the group because they have the power to do so and 
because it provides material benefits. When successful, discriminators 
secure higher incomes, more and better jobs, superior access to health 
care, and privileged access to state protection and resources. Thus, the 
interracial distribution of wealth and power are major determinants of 
economic and social outcomes. 
EXPLANATORY POWER OF ORTHODOX AND 
ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES 
Chart 1 captures the interpretive schizophrenia of orthodox economics. 
The top matrix refers to the orthodox approach, while the bottom matrix 
refers to the alternative approach. The rows of both matrices divide so- 
cioeconomic outcomes into two categories: desirable and undesirable. 
The columns of the matrices how the sign of the race effect, that is, the 
residual empirical correlation (after adjusting for observable differences 
in covariates) between African-American identity and socioeconomic out- 
comes. 1 Each residual correlation is derived from the extant literature 
(see Mason and Williams 1997). For example, after adjusting for racial 
differences in observable productively-linked characteristics, there re- 
mains a well-established negative correlation between African-American 
status and income while there is a positive residual correlation between 
African-American identity and lower life expectancy. Hence, lower life 
expectancy is one of the examples in the southwest corner of each ma- 
trix, while income is one of the examples in the northeast corner of each 
matrix. 
Orthodox interpretation is guided by three assumptions: 1) markets are 
generally competitive, 2) individuals are atomistic decision-makers, and 
3) African Americans possess inferior unobserved attributes. 2 The alter- 
native interpretation concedes that markets are generally competitive) 
However, it assumes that a) the social identities of individuals (race, 
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class, gender, etc.) are not divorced from market interactions; b) whites 
possess disproportionate social, economic, and political power; and c) 
there is no systematic racial pattern to the distribution of unobserved 
characteristics (other than the distribution of power and its concomitant 
control over resources and decision-making). 
From the orthodox perspective, African Americans obtain lower mar- 
ket income because they possess inferior unobserved characteristics. The 
explanations for this alleged inferiority include genetic inheritance 
(Herrnstein and Murray 1994), inferior school quality (Ferguson 2000; 
Maxwell 1995) due to some combination of pre-labor market discrimina- 
tion and adverse individual behavior, and other differences in family and 
community backgrounds (Neal and Johnson 1996). Regardless of the 
ultimate source--biology, non-market discrimination, individual behav- 
ior, family and community background--orthodox economists claim that 
after adjusting for differences in unobserved characteristics there is little 
if any interracial difference in market wage rates. Further, it is also 
argued that the lower quality or lower quantities of individual attributes 
explain the lower life expectancy and lower quality of health enjoyed by 
African Americans. 
The orthodox assumption ofAfrican-American i feriority breaks down 
when one examines interracial differences in years of education and par- 
ticipation in crime. In comparison to otherwise identical whites, African 
Americans are able to translate a given quantity (and quality) of family 
resources and other observed characteristics into greater years of educa- 
tion and a lower supply of criminal activity. 
The alternative xplanation focuses on social power. When African- 
American individuals, families, and communities exercise primary con- 
trol over resources and decision-making, there is a positive race effect 
associated with desirable socioeconomic outcomes and a negative re- 
sidual correlation with undesirable socioeconomic outcomes. On the other 
hand, when African-American individuals, families, and communities do 
not have primary control over resources and decision-making, there is a 
negative race effect associated with desirable socioeconomic outcomes 
and a positive residual correlation with undesirable socioeconomic out- 
comes. 
There are substantial differences in the public policy implications of 
the orthodox and alternative perspectives. The essence of the orthodox 
approach is that racial inequality is caused by persistently inappropriate 
behavior that is derived from dysfunctional family values, racial culture, 
or community environment of African Americans. Accordingly, there is 
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little that government can or should do. Government should limit itself to 
providing incentives for African Americans to alter their behavior or to 
relocate to communities with better schools and other social institutions. 
From the alternative perspective, persistent racial inequality is caused by 
persistent racial differences in access to wealth and power. Accordingly, 
public policy should focus on a more egalitarian distribution of wealth 
and power in addition to aggressive anti-discrimination measures. 
NON-MARKET EXAMPLE:  RATE OF IMPRISONMENT 
The African-American imprisonment rate is 8.5 times the white im- 
prisonment rate. 4 Mauer (1999) reports that African Americans are 40 
percent of the national prison population. Furthermore, on any given day 
32 percent of African-American males ages twenty to twenty-nine are 
under some form of criminal justice supervision, that is, prison or jail, 
parole, or probation. From the orthodox perspective these racial differ- 
ences are largely a reflection of inappropriate values and behaviors within 
African-American families and neighborhoods. Yet, the empirical evi- 
dence often shows a negative or insignificant race effect, i.e., all other 
things equal, African Americans are no more likely to be involved in 
criminal activity than otherwise identical whites. Hence, there is no prima 
facie evidence for the assertion that racial differences in imprisonment 
rates are due to racial differences in family values and behaviors. 
The alternative perspective encourages us to examine how racial ineq- 
uities in the criminal justice process contribute to racial differences in 
imprisonment rates. Chart 2 is a hypothetical representation of the deci- 
sion stages of the judicial process. It assumes that there is an equally 
probable chance (10 percent) that African Americans and whites will 
commit a criminal act. Next, the chart assumes that there are relatively 
small differences in the probabilities of arrest, severity of charge, convic- 
tion, severity of sentence, and time served before parole or release. Be- 
yond the individual's decision to commit a criminal act, there are five 
separate decisions (which produce eleven possible jail times) associated 
with an offense--each one of which may be affected by racial discrimi- 
nation, an inability to afford competent legal council, the racially dispar- 
ate impact of public policy, etc. Except for the decision to commit a 
criminal act, all of these decisions are outside the hand of individual 
African Americans and largely outside the control of the African-Ameri- 
can community. Chart 2 reveals that relatively small differences in the 
individual stages of the criminal justice process can lead to dramatic 
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CHART 2 
Hypothetical Differences in Racial Treatment in Judicial System 
African 
American White 
Probability of Committing aCrime 
Probability of Arrest 
Probability of Severe Charge v. Minimal Charge 
Probability of Conviction 
Probability of Maximal v. Minimal Sentence 
Probability of No Parole Before End of Sentence 
Probability of Being in Jail 
Relative Odds of Being in Jail 
0.1000 0.1000 
0.9000 0.8000 
0.4000 0.3000 
0.9000 0.8000 
0.5000 0.4000 
0.7000 0.6000 
0.0113 0.0046 
2.4609 0.4063 
differences in the probability of imprisonment. In this hypothetical ex- 
ample, African Americans are nearly two-and-a-half times as likely to be 
imprisoned as whites. 
MARKET EXAMPLE: EARNINGS 
Two of the more important labor market outcomes of the 1970s, 1980s, 
and 1990s include deterioration i the movement toward African-Ameri- 
can/white wage equality and increasing intraracial wage inequality. Or- 
thodox analysts uggest hat skill-biased technological progress has led 
to a rising skill premium. In turn, the higher skill premium has led to 
greater inter--and intraracial earnings inequality. 5 As intraracial inequal- 
ity among whites increased, interracial inequality between whites and 
African Americans also increased because African Americans are dispro- 
portionately ocated in the lower half of the white skill distribution. 
The racial gap in such factors as educational quality and years of 
education was declining throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s (Jencks, 
1993:177-179; Bernstein, 1995; Ferguson, 2000). The decline in the edu- 
cational quality gap would lead to a decrease in racial wage inequality, 
even as the rise in the rate of return to educational quality would lead to 
an expansion in racial wage inequality. Hence, we cannot attribute dete- 
rioration in the movement toward racial wage equality among recent 
labor force entrants to skill-biased technological progress unless it is 
further shown that the rate of return to educational quality was growing 
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at a faster rate than the decline in the racial gap in educational quality. 
One must also demonstrate hat skill-biased technological progress led to 
an increase in general wage inequality before the onset of the slowdown 
in the movement toward racial wage equality. 
Suppose DW is the racial wage differential and DS is the mean racial 
skill differential. A very simple model of the relationship between the 
differentials is DW = aDS, where a > 0. Hence, d(DW)/DW = da/a + 
d(DS)/DS. Murphy and Welch (1992: 300) show that the college gradu- 
ate-high school graduate wage ratio for workers with 1-5 years of expe- 
rience rose from 1.30 in 1979 to 1.74 in 1989, representing a 34 percent 
increase in the price of skill (daJa). This was the largest percentage 
increase for all experience groups. During 1980-1990, Bernstein (1995:18) 
shows that the racial gap in reading scores for seventeen-year-olds taking 
the National Assessment of Educational Progress declined by 41 percent. 
So, a rough estimate is d(DS)/DS = -0.41 and therefore growth in the 
price of skill would not have been sufficient to lead to an increase in 
racial wage inequality. Alternative measures of skill will certainly lead to 
different estimates of d(DS)/DS, just as alternative studies of changes in 
the skill premium will produce different estimates of da/a. We raise the 
issue here only to demonstrate hat it is one that the existing literature has 
passed over a bit too quickly. 6
If it is also the case that the racial wage differential began to stagnate 
or decline before the rate of return to educational quality began to in- 
crease, then we cannot draw the conclusion that rising interracial in- 
equality is merely a reflection of rising intraracial inequality. Indeed, the 
available evidence does suggest that the increase in rate of return to 
ability occurred after the movement toward racial equality began to stall 
(Mason 2000). Cawley, Heckman, and Vytlacil (1998) pinpoint the mid- 
1980s as the starting point of the rise in the rate of return to education. 
Even so, this increase in the rate of return to education occurred only for 
individuals in the highest ability quartile, but improvement in racial wage 
equality came to a halt in the early to mid-1970s. 
Contradicting the notion that skill-biased technical progress has cre- 
ated an excess demand for skilled workers and an excess supply of less 
skilled workers, Pryor and Schaffer (1999) argue that the demand for 
low-education workers has outgrown the supply of such workers, while 
the demand for college-educated workers has not grown as fast as the 
supply of college workers. It is only the demand for college workers with 
high levels of educational quality that has grown faster than the supply of 
college degree workers with high levels of educational quality. But the 
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excess demand for college degree workers with high levels of educa- 
tional quality is unrelated to the nature of technological progress. Rather, 
it has occurred primarily because of the particularities of labor force 
adjustments in the health care industry and in legal services. 
Pryor and Schaffer then argue that massive numbers of women enter- 
ing the labor have displaced men at all levels because mployers can and 
do pay women lower wages. Women with a college degree and high 
educational quality are able to displace less qualified men for high-wage 
jobs. Also, since workers with a college degree who do not have high 
levels of educational quality are in excess upply, they have begun filling 
jobs that have been traditionally filled by less-educated persons. Eventu- 
ally, those with the lowest years and quality of education are bumped out 
of employment and the labor force, especially among men, and their 
wages decline. 7 
For low-education occupations, wage inequality has increased also 
because of a decline in real value of the minimum wage rate and a large 
decrease in the rate of unionization. For occupations requiring a univer- 
sity education, wage inequality has increased because: wages in health 
care and legal services have grown faster than all others, employers have 
replaced men with women for lower wages, technological change has 
increased the demand for high educational quality workers, and increase 
in "winner-take-all" wage setting. 
An alternative line of research suggests two major factors in the rela- 
tive decline of African Americans' earnings: increased iscrimination, 
induced by greater interracial competition for income in an environment 
with greatly reduced anti-discrimination e forcement, and sharp reduc- 
tions in the bargaining power and standard of living for all workers due 
to the high unemployment of the 1970s and 1980s and accompanying 
changes in the nature of government policy. 
Consider that there was a sixteen-month inflationary recession from 
November 1973 to March 1975. 8 There was a six-month recession from 
January 1980 to July 1980. There was another recession of sixteen months 
during July 1981 to November 1982. So, the one-year recovery from July 
1980 to July 1981 provided only a brief pause in three years of stagna- 
tion from December 31, 1979 to December 31, 1982. 9 The Federal Re- 
serve System (Fed) reacted to the stagflation of 1974-75 and the follow- 
ing years of inflation by making a fundamental change in macroeco- 
nomic policy, that is, it became much more concerned with fighting 
inflation than fighting unemployment. Since the African-American un- 
employment rate is roughly twice the national average, African Ameri- 
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cans were disproportionately injured by the Fed's engineered increases in 
involuntary unemployment. 
According to Leonard (1991, 105), "affirmative action under the con- 
tract compliance program virtually ceased to exist in all but name after 
1980s." Leonard writes that by the mid-1980s affirmative action "no 
longer aided blacks." Rodgers and Spriggs (1996) also find that federal 
enforcement activities declined substantially in the 1980s. Accordingly, 
they find that contractor status made a greater contribution to firms' 
relative mployment of nonwhite workers during the 1990s than contrac- 
tor status made during 1980s when there were major changes in the 
nature and behavior of the federal anti-discrimination a d affirmative 
action machinery. 
The timing of these macroeconomic and policy changes uggests that 
major recessions bear some responsibility for the episodic nature of 
changes in residual racial wage inequality. As unemployment i creases 
and the average wage rate stagnates during periods of severe recession, 
job competition increases. Mason (1995, 1999) has argued that racial 
discrimination i employment is directly related to the intensity of job 
competition. So, as the economy enters a period of recovery and unem- 
ployment falls, residual wage inequality begins to decline. Changes in 
governmental policy affect he rate at which residual wage inequality is 
lowered during the recovery and the extent at which such inequality 
expands during downturns. 
DISCUSSION 
One clear implication of the Janus face of race is that the formation of 
racial norms among economists i not completely separable from the 
interpretation f statistical evidence on racial inequality. The racial-cul- 
tural identity of the economist informs the contextual meaning and inter- 
pretation of empirical analysis. A second point is that public policies 
flowing from the Janus face of race tend to reproduce racial inequality. 
A third point has been mentioned but not fully discussed here. The 
social norms representing the collective racial-cultural identity of agents 
are the result of strategic behavior among agents (Darity, Mason, and 
Stewart 2002). Assuming that identity enters directly into an agent's 
maximization function and that identity also affects the rate of return to 
productive attributes, one can show that strategic interaction among agents 
can lead to racialized economic equilibria that are resistant to a wide 
variety of potential mutations. In particular, very unrestrictive assump- 
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t ions show that the economy is quite l ike ly  to move to an equ i l ib r ium 
character ized by b i -po lar  rac ia l i zed ident i t ies  and pers istent  racial  weal th  
inequal i ty.  Hence,  atomist ic  agents devo id  o f  any racial ,  c lass,  or  gender  
ident i ty do not prov ide the appropr ia te  conceptua l  f ramework  for under-  
standing racial  inequal i ty .  Rhonda Wi l l i ams unders tood  this long before  
the deve lopment  of  our  formal  model .  
NOTES 
1. Consider the following regression model: y = X~ + R8 + ~, where y is a 
particular socioeconomic outcome, R is a dichotomous variable qual to 1 when the 
individual is an African American and equal 0 when the individual is white, X is a 
vector of observed individual characteristics, and ~ is a random error term. The race 
effect, that is, the residual correlation, is captured by i5. 
2. Let u represent the statistical effect of unobserved individual attributes. Modi- 
fying our empirical model we have y = X[3 + R8 + aJ + e. The orthodox argument is 
that d = 0 when we have controlled for unobserved individual attributes. 
3. Agreement that markets are generally competitive hardly implies agreement 
over theoretical conceptions of the competitive process. See Mason (1992) arid the 
accompanying references for a discussion of this issue. 
4. See http:l/www.sentencingproject.org/pubslpubs.html. March 26, 2002. 
5. See Darity and Mason (1998) for a detailed iscussion of the extant literature. 
6. Neal and Johnson (1996) is the most widely cited orthodox study. They exam- 
ine a sample of individuals born after 1961 and who were no more than 18 years of 
age when they took the AFQT in 1980, but who were 26-29 years of age in 1990-91 
when their hourly wages are observed. Wage observations less than $1.00 per hour 
or more than $75.00 per hour are deleted from their sample, while AFQT scores are 
both age-adjusted and standardized. They regress the mean 1990-91 log hourly wage 
rate against dichotomous race and ethnicity variables (black and Hispanic, respec- 
tively), AFQT, and AFQT 2. The gross wage differential is -0.24, but the residual 
racial wage differential from their regression is just -0.072. This result, however, 
does not tell us whether the rise in the rate of return to educational quality is 
responsible for the deterioration i the movement toward racial inequality that set in 
after the mid-1970s. That is, the Neal and Johnson study does not inform us whether 
or not the race coefficient from a similar regression would be greater or lower if we 
were able to regress early 1970s wages against pre-labor market AFQT scores. 
7. Of course, the increase in job competition also increases the opportunity for 
racial discrimination. However, Pryor and Schaffer are not primarily interested in the 
issue of discrimination so this latter point is never fully explored. 
8. See the National Bureau of Economic Research web page at http://www.nber.orgl 
cycles.html. 
9. Measuring output in 1992 dollars, the gross domestic product actually moved 
slightly downward from $4.63 trillion to $4.62 trillion during the three-year interval 
(Dornbusch, Fischer, and Startz 1998, appendix). 
REFERENCES 
Baron, H. "The Demand for Black Labor: Historical Notes on the Political Economy 
of Racism." Radical America (March-April 1971): 1-46. 
74 The  Rev iew of  B lack  Po l i t i ca l  Economy/Spr ing  2002 
Bernstein, J. "Where's the Payoff? The Gap Between Black Academic Progress and 
Economic Gains." Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, 1995. 
Cawley, John, James Heckman, and Edward Vytlacil. "Cognitive Ability and the 
Rising Return to Education." NBER Working Paper No. W6388, 1998. 
Cox, Oliver C. Caste, Class, & Race. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1959. 
Darity, Jr., William A. "What's Left of the Theory of Discrimination." In The 
Question of Discrimination: Racial bwquali~ in the U. S. Labor Market, edited 
by S. Shulman and William A. Darity, Jr. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University 
Press, 1989. 
_ _  and P. Mason. "Evidence on Discrimination i Employment: Codes of Color, 
Codes of Gender." Jout~lal of Economic Perspectives 12(2) (Spring 1998): 63-90. 
_ _  and R. Williams. (1985). "Peddlers Forever?: Culture, Competition, and 
Discrimination." Papers and Proceedings of the American Economic Review 75(2) 
(May 1985): 256-261. 
Ferguson, R. "Test-Score Trends Along Racial Lines, 1971 to 1996: Popular Culture 
and Community Academic Standards." In America Becoming: Racial Trends and 
Their Consequences, Volume 1, edited by N. Smelser, W. J. Wilson, and Mitchell. 
Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2000. 
Harris, D. "The Black Ghetto as 'Internal Colony': A Theoretical Critique and Alter- 
native Formulation." Review of Black Political Economy (Summer 1972): 3-33. 
Herrnstein, Richard J., and Charles Murray. The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class 
Structure in American Life. New York: Free Press, 1994. 
Jencks, C. Rethinking Social Policy: Race, Poverty and the Underclass. New York: 
Harper Perennial, 1993. 
Leonard, J. "The Federal Anti-Bias Effort." In Essays on the Economics of Discrimi- 
nation, edited by Emily Hoffman. Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research, 1991. 
Marable, Manning. How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America : Problems in 
Race, Political Economy and Society. Boston: South End Press, 1983. 
Mason, P. "Persistent Discrimination--Racial Disparity in the US, 1967-1988.'" 
American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings 90(2) (May 2000): 
312-316. 
. "Male Interracial Wage Differentials: Competing Explanations." Cambridge 
Journal of Economics 23 (May 1999): 1-39. 
. "'Race, Culture, and Skill: Interracial Wage Differences Among African 
Americans, Latinos, and Whites." Review of Black Political Economy 25(3) (Winter 
1997): 5-40. 
. "Race, Competition and Differential Wages." Cambridge Journal of Eco- 
nomics 19(4) (August 1995): 545-568. 
. "The Divide-and-Conquer and Employer/Employee Models of Discrimina- 
tion: Neoclassical Competition as Familial Defect." Review of Black Political 
Economy 20(4) (Spring 1992): 73-89. 
Mason, P., and Rhonda Williams. Editors. Race, Markets, and Social Outcomes. 
Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997. 
Mauer, Mark. "The Crisis of the Young African American Male and the Criminal 
Justice System." Prepared for U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Washington, 
DC, 1999. 
Maxwell, N. "The Effect on Black-White Wage Differentials of Differences in the 
Quantity and Quality of Education." Industrial and I, ztbor Relations Review 47(2) 
(January 1995): 249-26. 
Murphy, K., and F. Welch. "The Structure of Wages." Quarterly Journal of Eco- 
nomics CVII (1) (February 1992): 285-326. 
Mason 75 
Neal, D., and W. Johnson9 "The Role of Pre-Market Factors in Black-White Wage 
Differences." The Journal of Political Economy 104 (1996): 869-895. 
Omi, Michael, and Howard Winant. Racial Formation in the United States: From 
the 1960s to the 1990s, 2nd edition. New York: Routledge, 1994. 
Pryor, F. L., and D. L. Schaffer. Who's Not Working and Why: Employment, Cogni- 
tive Skills, Wages, and the Changing US Labor Market. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999. 
Rodgers, III, W. M., and William E. Spriggs. "The Effect of Federal Contractor 
Status on Racial Differences in Establishment-Level Employment Shares: 1979- 
1992." American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings 86(2) (May 
1996): 290-293. 
Swinton, D. "A Labor Force Competition Model of Racial Discrimination in the 
Labor Market." Review of Black Political Economy 9(1 ) (Fall 1978): 5-42. 
Williams, Eric. Capitalism & Slavery. London: A. Deutsch, 1983, c1944. 
Williams, R. (1991). "Competition, Discrimination and Differential Wage Rates: On 
the Continued Relevance of Marxian Theory to the Analysis of Earnings and 
Employment Inequality." In New Approaches to the Economic and Social Analy- 
sis of Discrimination, edited by R. Cornwall and P. Wunnava. New York: Praeger, 
1991. 
9 "Capital, Competition, and Discrimination: A Reconsideration f Racial 
Earnings Inequality." Review of Radical Political Economics 19(2) (Summer 1987): 
1-15. 
Williams, R., and R. Kenison. "The Way We Were?: Discrimination, Competition, 
and Inter-Industry Wage Differentials in 1970." Review of Radical Political Eco- 
nomics 28(2) (June 1996): 1-32. 
